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  Abstract. Although federal and state regulations have 
greatly reduced pollutants from concentrated animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs), pollutants from manure 
applications on land continue to impair water quality. 
Producers of confined animals not regulated as CAFOs 
have few incentives to adopt practices to minimize 
pollution. Given contamination from these producers, 
regulators might develop a plan to encourage practices to 
reduce contaminants entering waters. This paper 
proposes an incentive to encourage farmers to employ 
best management practices in the application of manure 
to lands. Farmers who fail to employ acceptable manure 
application measures would be disqualified from the 
state’s anti-nuisance defense. In this manner, a 
government could reduce pollutants from manure 





 The production of animals has been accompanied by 
problems involving allegations of water pollution 
(Bakhsh et al., 2005; Elrashidi et al., 2005). Large animal 
production facilities and the concentration of the 
livestock industry in regions (Gollehon et al., 2001) have 
been accompanied by wastes containing nitrogen and 
phosphorus that contaminate waters (Ribaudo et al., 
1999; Sharpley et al., 2000). Responses to these 
problems include recommendations of management 
practices to minimize pollutants that enter waters (Araji 
et al., 2001; Letson et al., 1998). 
 Federal and state governments have adopted 
legislation to control this pollution, and regulatory 
agencies have been busy amending regulations to 
implement the legislative changes (Centner, 2004b; 
Metcalfe, 2000). The most visible regulations are those 
adopted pursuant to the Clean Water Act that govern 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs). As a 
result of challenges by environmental groups, the 
Environmental Protection Agency has amended the 
federal CAFO Rule (Environmental Protection Agency, 
2003; Environmental Protection Agency, 2006). The 
proscriptions set forth in the Rule should lead to the 
abatement of some pollution from large animal 
producers. 
 However, the CAFO Rule does not address pollution 
from most animal production units. Only about 15,000 
operations will need to secure a permit under the Rule, 
meaning that 223,000 confined animal feeding 
operations do not have to follow the water quality 
provisions of the CAFO Rule (Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2003). Moreover, some states’ governments are 
precluded by state law from adopting water quality rules 
more stringent than federal rules (Arizona Revised 
Statutes, 2006). These “no-more-stringent-than” laws are 
intended to provide assurance to businesses that the 
state’s environmental controls will not impose costs that 
would place the businesses at a disadvantage to 
competitors in other states.  
 Because most states do not prescribe water quality 
requirements for animal producers beyond those dictated 
by the Clean Water Act, no meaningful regulations 
control the discharge of pollutants from those confined 
operations not regulated as CAFOs. Governments might 
direct more attention to these nonregulated operations. 
While agriculture traditionally has used manure to 
enhance crop performance, an overabundance of animal 
wastes at an operation may require governments to take 
further action to advance the more provident use of this 
byproduct. Although state legislatures might consider 
imposing mandatory guidelines limiting the amounts of 
animal manure that may be applied to lands (Centner, 
2004a), this would be costly. An alternative response 
advocated by this paper involves the use of an incentive 
to encourage all animal producers to employ best 
management practices in the application of manure to 
minimize the flow of contaminants into waters. 
 
 
OVERSIGHT OF MANURE DISPOSAL 
 
 Three sets of water quality regulations have been 
adopted to help safeguard our country’s water quality. 
For producers of animals, nonpoint-source water quality 
regulations provide encouragement for practices that 
minimize pollution. Second, federal and state CAFO 
regulations enumerate requirements of practices that 
apply to operations with large numbers of animals and a 
discharge of pollutants to waters. Third, federal effluent 
limitation guidelines provide more stringent controls but 
only apply to a limited number of CAFOs.  
 
Nonpoint-Source Provisions 
 Animal production units that do not meet the 
definition of a CAFO are subject to federal and state 
nonpoint-source pollution regulations. For areas with 
substantial water quality problems, states are required to 
develop and implement area-wide waste treatment 
management plans that include a process to identify 
runoff from manure disposal areas and land used for 
livestock production (U.S. Code, 2000). States also must 
prepare state management programs for controlling 
pollution emanating from nonpoint sources, including the 
implementation of best management practices (U.S. 
Code, 2000).  
 While the nonpoint-source water pollution 
regulations help reduce the impairment of waters, they do 
not set forth specific requirements governing the 
application of manure. Therefore, the provisions do not 
preclude confined animal operations from engaging in 
practices that cause contaminants to enter waters. 
Moreover, regulators are not assessing meaningful 
penalties for violations of nonpoint-source regulations. 
 
CAFO Regulations  
 The CAFO Rule delineates a permitting system with 
mandatory, regulatory controls for those CAFOs having 
a discharge of pollutants. The Rule prescribes best 
management practices for the application of manure to 
fields for minimizing the impairment of water quality. 
Due to the costs imposed by the permitting system, the 
requirements of the CAFO Rule only apply to large 
operations. Under the CAFO Rule, states have adopted 
regulations delineating practices for manure application. 
For example, Iowa’s environmental protection rules 
prescribe requirements in Chapter 65 of the Iowa 
Administrative Code. Minnesota has prescribed rules for 
CAFOs in Rule 7020.  
 In Iowa, regulated CAFOs are precluded from 
applying “manure in excess of the nitrogen use levels 
necessary to obtain optimum crop yields” (Iowa 
Administrative Code, 2005). Other significant practices 
are governed by recommendations, such as limitations on 
phosphorus applications, spreading manure on land 
adjacent to water bodies, and applying manure on snow-
covered ground (Iowa Administrative Code, 2005). 
CAFOs are encouraged to adopt those practices but do 
not violate regulations if they decline to do so. 
 Chapter 7020 of the Minnesota Rules enumerates 
numerous regulations for the land application of manure. 
These regulations cover basic practices such as 
application near water bodies or on steeply sloping 
croplands. A few provisions are quite specific, such as 
limitations on the application of manure on snow-
covered ground. Other provisions are rather general, such 
as Minnesota’s prohibition on applying manure to “cause 
pollution of waters of the state . . . ” (Minnesota Rules, 
2003). However, these provisions governing the 
application of manure only apply to some animal feeding 
operations. Moreover, governments may not prosecute 
violators due to difficulties in proving a deviation from 
required standards and the source of pollutants. Few 
sanctions are imposed on persons who impair waters 
with animal waste.  
 
Effluent Limitation Guidelines 
 Federal effluent limitation guidelines for large cattle, 
dairy, swine, and poultry CAFOs prescribe best 
management practices for the application of manure 
(Code of Federal Regulations, 2005). These CAFOs need 
a nutrient management plan “based on a field-specific 
assessment of the potential for nitrogen and phosphorus 
transport from the field.” Manure needs to be applied 
according to agronomic rates to avoid pollution from 
overapplication.  
 Technical standards in nutrient management plans 
delineate field-specific assessments of the potential for 
nitrogen and phosphorus transport from the field to 
surface waters, address the application of nutrients on 
each field to achieve realistic production goals, and 
minimize nitrogen and phosphorus movement to surface 
waters. By incorporating agronomic rate requirements, 
manure applications do not involve the overapplication 
of waste. The effluent limitation guidelines help 
minimize adverse impacts on water quality.  
 
ADOPTING AN INCENTIVE NOT TO POLLUTE 
 
 The issue is whether a government might take 
additional action to encourage the land application of 
manure pursuant to best management practices and thus 
minimize the flow of contaminants into waters. The 
existing regulations for CAFOs enunciate practices that 
significantly reduce the flow of contaminants into waters, 
but do not apply to most confined animal feeding 
operations. To further reduce animal production 
pollutants from contaminating waters, encouragement 
might be given to all producers to adopt best manage-
ment practices for manure application. Because 
governments are hesitant to impose mandatory, water-
quality controls on non-CAFOs, an alternative strategy is 
needed.  
 To complement the permitting provisions for 
CAFOs, a government might offer an incentive to 
encourage practices to reduce pollution from non-
CAFOs. While incentives often involve money, another 
type of incentive is to adopt a qualification for 
governmental benefits. By delineating voluntary manure 
management practices as a qualification for a govern-
ment benefit, a government could offer greater 
encouragement for eliminating activities that contribute 
to water pollution. For producers of animals, the 
qualification could involve the employment of best 
management practices in the application of manure to 
lands. In this manner, fewer pollutants from the 
application of animal waste would be expected to impair 
water quality.  
 
The Federal Swampbuster Provision 
 Congress adopted a qualification for a federal benefit 
in the “swampbuster” provision of the Food Security Act 
of 1985 (Public Law No. 99-198, 1985). Swampbuster 
provides that agricultural producers who grow crops on 
converted wetlands become ineligible for various 
benefits available under federal farm programs. The 
government’s objective was to prevent the destruction of 
wetlands by agricultural producers. The means adopted 
to achieve the objective was to limit federal farm 
program benefits to producers who desisted from 
converting wetlands to other land uses (Heimlich et al., 
1998). This discloses a voluntary approach to foster an 
environmental objective. Farmers have the option of 
draining wetlands, but if they select this option, they 
become ineligible for federal farm program benefits. 
Many farmers have refrained from draining wetlands 
given the potential loss of participation in these programs 
(Kramer and Shabman, 1993). 
 The federal swampbuster provision shows that an 
incentive does not have to be directly related to the 
environmental goal or mandatory controls. Rather, 
Congress furthered its environmental objective of 
preserving wetlands by placing a qualification on 
participation in federal farm programs. Producers who 
converted wetlands to cropland were simply ineligible to 
participate in federal farm programs. In an analogous 
fashion, it may be possible to reduce contamination from 
livestock production by disqualifying producers from a 
benefit if they fail to comply with voluntary best 
management practices for manure application. To 
advance the goal of reducing the impairment of waters, 
legislators might identify a benefit and adopt a 
qualification for the benefit. 
 
State Right-to-Farm Laws 
 A governmental benefit that could be employed for 
this purpose is the anti-nuisance protection offered 
agricultural producers by state right-to-farm laws. Anti-
nuisance laws were enacted to support the retention of 
farmland by reducing situations whereby nuisance law 
can be used to end an agronomic activity (Grossman and 
Fischer, 1983). The laws were also intended to protect 
the existing investments of farmers in agricultural 
operations (Hand, 1984). To accomplish these objectives, 
the laws incorporated a “coming to the nuisance” 
doctrine. Persons moving adjacent to an offensive 
activity can be precluded by the statutory defense from 
obtaining an injunction. For producers of animals, this 
means that smelly manure application activities may 
continue so long as the practices existed prior to persons 
moving to the area and complaining about them.  
 State right-to-farm laws show equitable considera-
tions in granting special dispensation for qualifying 
business activities. Two major considerations are 
significant. First, a law recognizes contributions of 
existing businesses to an area’s economy and seeks to 
assist businesses in continuing their activities. Second, 
right-to-farm laws protect and encourage investments in 
facilities by assuring persons they may continue with 
activities even if neighboring land uses change. Despite 
the negative effects agricultural activities may have on 
future neighboring property owners, legislatures have 
made a policy decision to provide anti-nuisance 
protection. 
 Given that anti-nuisance laws favor agricultural 
producers and other businesses over neighboring land 
owners, a legislature might decide that the special 
dispensation is not needed if a producer is imposing 
environmental damages on others. Operators of confined 
animal operations who fail to employ best management 
practices in the application of manure to lands are 
impairing water quality. The failure to employ best 
management practices might disqualify them from state 
anti-nuisance protection. A qualification could be added 
to an anti-nuisance law whereby persons could only 
qualify for anti-nuisance protection if they apply manure 





 The best management practices required by the 
CAFO Rule and effluent limitation guidelines may be 
used for defining the qualification for anti-nuisance 
protection. Best management practices are reasonable 
and prudent methods for the application of manure to 
pastures and fields at agronomic rates so that the manure 
serves as a source of nutrients for plant growth. This 
involves the development and implementation of a 
nutrient management plan with agronomic manure 
application rates to minimize phosphorus and nitrogen 
transport from fields to surface waters (Code of Federal 
Regulations, 2005). Technical standards in each plan 
delineate field-specific assessments of the potential for 
nitrogen and phosphorus transport from the field to 
surface waters.  
 Under this proposal, additional mandatory water 
quality controls would not be used to reduce the 
impairment of water quality. The mandatory regulations 
for CAFOs would be retained, complemented by an 
incentive for other producers to voluntarily adopt 
appropriate manure application practices to qualify for 
state anti-nuisance protection. Since many small 
livestock producers live in urban fringe areas where 
nuisance lawsuits are a concern, this incentive might be 
expected to lead to better manure application practices. 
Producers’ responses to swampbuster suggest that many 
confined animal feeding operators would desire to 
qualify for the incentive and would structure their 
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